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Metacognition, defined either epistemo-
logically as knowledge about knowledge
or operationally as behavior about behav-
ior (Koriat, 2007), presumably enables
intelligent agents to self-referentially
and, in social contexts (Bahrami et al.,
2010, 2012), group-referentially monitor
and control emotions, moods, percep-
tions, memories, reasoning, decisions,
and actions. At an epistemological level
of description, the nested referent nature
of metacognition succumbs to problems
originating from recursively enumerable
propositional logic; that, as Kurt Gödel
(1931) first proved for Bertrand Russell
and Alfred North Whitehead’s axiomatic
Principia Mathematica, the meaning of
statements created about conditions of a
system or set of systems by the respec-
tive same system or set of systems can
be formally undecidable. Momentarily
ignoring peripheral confounds introduced
by stochastic and imperfect biological
systems, animal and human metacogni-
tive operations and all their possibilities
must thus exist in a universe of graded
logicomathematical consistency (i.e.,
All theorems are true syntax-correct
propositions of the system.) and com-
pleteness (i.e., All true syntax-correct
propositions of the system are theorems.)
(Kreisel, 1967). Because strong consistency
excludes strong completeness, the knotted
statements of metacognition may show
themselves to be falsehoods, truths, or
truths essentially unverifiable in theory as
well as in subjective and objective practice
(Figure 1) (Raattkainen, 2005).
Psychologists well understand the fal-
libility of formal logic systems and of
axiomatic animal and human psycholog-
ical processes, including, among other
phenomena, feature detection, inferential
judgments, error diagnosis and correction,
concept formation, memory storage and
retrieval, and introspection (cf. Nisbett
and Ross, 1980; Kahneman et al., 1982;
Watanabe and Huber, 2006). We often
stipulate—with qualifications—the flawed
definition(s) and agent execution of cogni-
tion and metacognition (e.g., Shimamura
and Metcalfe, 1994; Koriat and Goldsmith,
1996, 1998; Smith, 2009; Terrace and
Son, 2009; Frith, 2012; Fleming et al.,
2012; Yeung and Summerfield, 2012). For
pragmatic reasons, many of us enthusi-
astic about studying metacognition also
avoid the strange, looping causality of self-
reference exposed with Gödelian num-
bering to concentrate on solving basic
and/or clinical empirical difficulties that
arise when trying to identify this stub-
bornly opaque hypothetical construct of
healthy and pathological minds (e.g., Bach
and David, 2006; Koren et al., 2006; Vance,
2006; Carruthers, 2009; Gumley, 2011;
Brevers et al., 2013).
The operational opacity of metacog-
nition becomes arguably most apparent
when considering: (1) poor subjective
accessibility to the cognition and metacog-
nition of animals and humans of limited
or no language proficiency (cf. Hampton,
2009; Fleming and Dolan, 2012; Kepecs
and Mainen, 2012; Smith et al., 2012),
(2) the synergism and antagonism of
unreliable explicit and implicit psy-
chological components that mask real
metacognitive abilities and capacities
from agent and external observer (cf.
Hampton, 2009; Fleming et al., 2012),
and (3) the occasional independence
between metacognition and cognitive
skills which may exacerbate the preceding
two problems (cf. Koriat and Goldsmith,
1998; Schneider, 1999). A case illustrat-
ing these three classes of problems is
found for Paulus et al. (2013), who report
evidence of implicit metacognition in
normal preschool children performing
a paired-associates learning and mem-
ory task. The authors confront the
dilemma of metacognition opacity with
a paradigm common to belief, memory,
Theory of Mind, and now metacognition
research (cf. Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Penn
and Povinelli, 2007; Carruthers, 2009;
Hampton, 2009; Izard, 2009; Frith, 2012;
Skarratt et al., 2012); they prescribe objec-
tively observable, variable primary and
secondary behaviors that can be scored for
accuracy and/or efficiency and for cross-
correlations involving use of secondary
behaviors to monitor and control pri-
mary behaviors. A typical test scenario
has subjects follow associative learning
with forced-choice declarative recogni-
tion of perceptual/conceptual pairings
between two separate images. Subjects
subsequently give confidence judgments
of memory accuracy through explicit
self-reports, such as scalar feelings, and
implicit reactions, such as changes in
traceable voluntary gaze or involuntary
saccades, pupil dilation, pressor effects,
and electrical properties of skin. Ratings
of accuracy confidence reflect an agent’s
more-or-less accessible knowledge repre-
sentation and decisional or post-decisional
monitoring and control.
By combining experimental protocols
that test for self-reports and behavioral
reactions, scientists, including Paulus et al.
(2013), hope to objectify a subject’s mental
states irrespective of his/her language skills
as well as dissociate and double dissociate
confounding explicit and implicit infor-
mation processing. For example, Paulus
et al. (2013) demonstrate implicit confi-
dence judgments (i.e., gaze direction and
duration and pupil area) can be supe-
rior in memory accuracy to prompted
explicit judgments (i.e., self-report).
Increased eye responses coincide with
increased (pre)attention demand or load,
suggesting humans might be more capable
of successfully monitoring judgments at a
preattentive or non-conscious level during
www.frontiersin.org April 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 171 | 1
Clark and Hassert Metacognition undecidability and opacity
FIGURE 1 | Diagram outlines relationship of metacognition
undecidability and opacity with epistemological and operational
definitions, where decidability of logicomathematical formalism is a
stronger, more global condition than transparency of empiricism.
Interestingly, the nested referent structure of epistemological and
operational definitions may also lead to the paradox that not only is the
meaningfulness of metacognition undecidable, but so too is the
meaningfulness of (explicit and implicit) reasoning used to reach that
conclusion. Anti-mechanistic, -algorithmic, or -logic views of animal and
human intelligence find varying degrees of support from noted thinkers
in physics (Penrose, 1994), logic (Kreisel, 1967), philosophy, (Lucas, 1962)
and psychology (Kahneman et al., 1982). Though a staunch
anti-Intuitionist and pro-mathematical Platonist, Gödel (1951/1995) believed
the human mind could overcome with empirical certainty such
circumstances as “absolutely unsolvable Diophantine problems” and
other undecidable problems suggestive of his theorems.
earlier stages of cognitive development.
This sort of approach toward investigating
metacognition now seems routine though
its widespread appeal dates back roughly
35 years (cf. Flavell, 1979). It builds
upon the efforts of Thorndike (1911),
Köhler (1927), and additional pioneer-
ing psychologists, who inferred mentality
in laboratory and wild animals incapable
of symbolic communication. Middle to
late twentieth century primatologists
especially began to embrace behavioral
methodology as a tool to compare and
contrast the cognitive development and
capacity of non-human primates with
humans, particularly periverbal neonates,
toddlers, and preschoolers (Parker and
McKinney, 1999). The value of cross-
taxonomic analyses and concomitant
realization that oral and written verbal
self-reports can be inaccurate, due to lack
of awareness and incidental mental events,
such as confabulation, illusory perception,
cued or irretrievable memory, affect bias,
and knowledge lean (e.g., Nisbett and
Wilson, 1977; Berry and Broadbent, 1984),
triggered this paradigm shift away from
once favored subjective human intro-
spection techniques. Some authorities
even believe advances in metacogni-
tion research are only achievable with
improved behavioral models (e.g., Terrace
and Son, 2009; Kepecs and Mainen, 2012).
Besides phenomenological and mecha-
nistic insights, studies such as Paulus et al.
(2013) on developmental complexity and
stages of metacognition across animal and
human lifespans figure to clarify the eco-
logical relevance of metacognition, with
numerous ramifications for parenting,
education, crime, and public health. The
weighty private and public consequences
of metacognition then necessitate that
metacognition be researched and inter-
preted with exceeding care in regard to
cognitive transparency of test paradigms.
Debates concerning the effectiveness
of standard behavioral tests to reduce
metacognition opacity remain spirited
at best. Akin to faults of introspection and
self-reports (Clark, 2012), behaviors are
susceptible to incidental and (pre)attentive
disturbances which influence perception,
memory, and performance and which may
be improperly controlled with experiment
conditions (cf. Penn and Povinelli, 2007;
Hampton, 2009; Smith, 2009; Smith et al.,
2012). Perhaps most alarming, however,
are assertions condemning instances of
behaviorally measured metacognition in
animals and language-challenged humans
as nothing more than automatic (i.e., non-
reflective), low-level associative response
contingencies (Penn and Povinelli, 2007;
Hampton, 2009). A conclusion Paulus
et al. (2013) also admit could not be
negated for some of their observations
on the relationship of pupil size, memory
retrieval, and metacognition.
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This kind of harsh indictment, if
correct, despite correlative neurometric
findings from non-invasive EEG, PET,
fMRI, and SQUID brain recordings
(e.g., Fleming and Dolan, 2012), sadly
almost reaffirms outcomes of Gödel’s
Incompleteness Theorems—the nested
referential structure of metacognition
may prevent metacognition from ever
being fully transparent to empiricism and,
therefore, makes its emergent meaning-
fulness perhaps hopelessly undecidable
for epistemological and operational def-
initions (Figure 1). However, empiricists
tend to believe, as we and Paulus and
colleagues do, perfecting the state-of-art
for metacognition paradigms gives fair
cause for optimism. Gödel (1951/1995)
himself considered logicomathematical
formalism to exist independently above
animal and human mentality. He also
denied that his theorems substantiated,
with logicomathematical certainty, the
concept of humanly unsolvable objective
or subjective problems. With irony, he felt
this could be known for external or inter-
nal (self) observer alone through rational
empiricism.
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